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This paper provides a set of results on the econometric identifiability of binary choice 
models with social interactions.  Social interactions models have achieved recent 
prominence as economic analyses have attempted to incorporate the social effects of 
group memberships in understanding individual decisionmaking.  Our analysis moves 
beyond parametric identification results that have been obtained in the literature to 
consider the identifiability of model parameters when the distribution of random payoff 
terms is unknown.  Further, we consider how identification is affected by the presence of 
unobservable payoff terms of various types as well as identification in the presence of 
certain forms of endogenous group membership.  Our results suggest that identification 
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  This paper analyzes the identifiability of social interactions for binary choice 
models.  In social interactions models, individual decisions are assumed to depend on 
various characteristics of the groups of which a given agent is a member. Social 
interactions have become an increasingly influential component of economic reasoning; 
Brock and Durlauf (2001b) and Manski (2000) survey a range of contexts in which social 
interactions have been argued to explain individual and aggregate outcomes.  From the 
perspective of economic theorizing, the study of social interactions is important as it 
integrates substantive sociological ideas with formal economic reasoning.  Early 
applications of social interactions to substantive theoretical problems include analyses of  
patterns of residential segregation (Schelling (1971)) and racial inequality (Loury 
(1977)); recent contributions include volatility in financial markets, (Brock (1993)), 
cross-city variation in crime (Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996)), and welfare 
dependence (Nechyba (2001)). Social interactions models may also be understood as 
exploring the consequences for individuals of their location in social space (cf. Akerlof 
(1997)); as such they are a complement to various spatial approaches to modeling; see 
Anselin (2003) for a discussion of spatial approaches to externalities.  
While empirical work has overall lagged behind theoretical analyses of social 
interactions, a growing number of empirical studies have explored aspects of such 
1dependence.
2  Examples include Crane (1991) and South and Baumer (2000) who 
explore how neighborhood parental characteristics affect teenage fertility, Bertrand, 
Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000) who analyze the role of aggregate ethnic group 
participation on individual welfare participation, Aizer and Currie (2002), who show how 
the use of publicly funded prenatal care is linked to social networks, Ioannides and Zabel 
(2003a,2003b) who identify social determinants of housing demand, and Sirakaya (2002) 
who evaluates the role of social interactions in criminal behavior.   
                                                           
1Authors such as Conley and Topa (2002), Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996) 
and Topa (2001) consider identification of social interactions using data that are 
aggregated at a group level. 
2 Empirical work on social interaction effects is surveyed in Durlauf (2003). 
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The purpose of this paper is to develop an analysis of the identification problem 
for social interactions in binary choice models using individual level data.  Binary choice 
environments represent an important leading case for social interactions. One reason that 
the binary choice context is interesting is that many of the behaviors in which social 
interactions have been posited to matter, e,g, nonmartial fertility, commission of a crime, 
use of cigarettes, are binary in nature.  In addition, binary choice models of social 
interactions possess a number of interesting theoretical properties, such as multiple 
equilibria and phase transition (the potential for qualitative changes in the properties of 
the model to change with small changes in model parameters) that are not present in 
linear-in means models.  
Relative to previous work, we establish that the identification of social 
interactions in a binary choice context may be achieved under weaker assumptions than 
have appeared in the literature.  For example, we show that identification does not require 
prior knowledge of the parametric specification of the distribution function for random 
utility terms.  As such, our analysis represents an extension of Manski (1988), who 
studies identification of binary choice models without parametric distributional 
assumptions, to models with social interactions and an extension of Brock and Durlauf 
(2001a,b), who study identification of social interactions in discrete choice models, to a 
broader set of environments.  Beyond an amalgamation of the analyses in these papers, 
we also analyze the identification of social interaction in the presence of unobserved 
group effects.   
  Section 2 of the paper describes the basic theoretical structure of binary choice 
social interactions models and discusses econometrically implementable versions of the 
models. Section 3 provides results on identification when group memberships are 
randomly assigned.  Section 4 discusses identification when group memberships are 
nonrandom. Section 5 provides conclusions.  
 
 
2. Binary choice with social interactions 
 
  2 
A general model of binary choice with social interactions is developed in Brock 
and Durlauf (2001a,b) and is the template for our identification analysis.  We consider a 
sample of I  individuals; individual i is a member of group  ; the group memberships 
are known to the econometrician.  There are 
g
1... gG =  groups in the population.  
Individual choices are coded by  { 1,1} i ω ∈ − .  These choices are determined by 
five factors:  
 
1. observable individual-specific characteristics, measured by an  -vector  r i X ,  
 
2. unobservable individual characteristics summarized by a scalar  i ε .  
 
3. observable group characteristics, measured by an  -vector  s g Y ; these are known 
as contextual effects as they relate to how characteristics of a group affect its members, 
 
4. unobservable (to the econometrician) group characteristics, measured by a 
scalar  g α , 
 
5. subjective expectation by agent i of the average choice in the group  ; this 
is known as an endogenous effect as it describes how the behaviors of others (mediated 





These factors are assumed to produce payoffs for the possible choices,   and  () 1 i u ( ) 1 i u −  
such that the difference between these payoffs is additive in the various factors, i.e. 
 
  () ( ) , 11
e
ii i g i g g uu k c X d Y J m i α ε −− = + + + +−  (1)
3
 
                                                           
3In eq. (1) and elsewhere, it is understood that variables indexed by   refer to the group 
of which i is a member whenever the equation describes an individual-level relationship. 
g
  3 
Choice 1 is made when this difference is positive.   The random payoff terms  i ε  are 
assumed to be drawn from a common distribution function 
,, ig g XY F
ε α  and are conditionally 
(given  , a n d   ig g XY α ) independent.  
We assume that subjective beliefs are rational, given information on the group 
level characteristics  g Y  and  , g g XY F α , the distribution function of  i X  conditional on the  
observable and unobservable (to the econometrician) group characteristics; this last term 
allows for heteroskedasticity in the distribution of individual characteristics across 
groups, for example. Hence the subjective expectations   coincide with  ,
e
ig m g m , the 
mathematical expectation of the average choice in group  g  given  and  g g Y α .  Since  
 
  ()( ) ,, ,, 2 1
ig g
e
ii gg i g g g XY EX Y F k c X d Y J m
εα ωα α = +++ +−  (2) 
 
g m  is defined by the integral 
 
  ( ) ,, , 21
gg gg gg g g XY XY mF k c X d Y J m d F
εα α α =+ + + + ∫ . −  (3) 
 
It is possible for there to exist multiple values of  g m  that fulfill (3); intuitively the 
dependence of the payoff (1) on  g m  produces an expectations-based complementarity
4 
between individual decisions that can generate multiple self-consistent behaviors in the 
population as a whole. As shown in Brock and Durlauf (2003), multiplicity versus 
uniqueness in the equilibrium expected average choice levels will depend on the interplay 
of the strength of social interactions, measured by   and features of the distribution of  J
, g g Y F
ε α , specifically the degree of dispersion of the random payoff terms; Theorem 3 of 
that paper specifically shows that for a given set of parameters   and 
distribution functions 
, , ,  kcdJ
, g g Y F
ε α and 
, g g XY F
α , there will always exist a threshold J  (which 
                                                           
4See Cooper (1999) for a general discussion of the relationship between 
complementarities and multiple equilibria. 
  4 
depends on the parameters and distributions), such that if JJ > , there must exist 
multiple values of  g m  that solve (3).  Note that when multiple solutions exist, it is 
assumed that agents know which solution describes expected average choices in  ; put 
differently, agents know which equilibrium expected average choice level is selected.    
g
Our objective in the following discussion is to determine conditions under which 
information about   may be obtained from data.  We will focus on both 
point identification, i.e. conditions under which the values of these parameters are 
identified, as well as partial identification,
, , ,  and    kcd J
5 i.e. conditions under which nontrivial 
restrictions on the possible values of   may be obtained.  Our discussion 
will be particularly concerned with the social interactions parameters   and  .  The   
parameter is of particular interest as it is the hypothesis that   that typically underlies 
theoretical models of social interactions. In fact, while it is relatively uncontroversial to 
assume that students in a class are affected by teacher quality or educational resources 
available in a classroom (both of which are contextual effects) it is more controversial to 
assume that the effort or learning of one student depends on the effort or learning of 
others.  And as indicated above, from a theoretical perspective, the finding that   is 
of particular importance because of its implications for the presence of multiple 
equilibria.  From the perspective of econometrics, an important class of identification 
issues is driven by the question of when contextual social interactions effects generated 
by 




g Y  may be distinguished from endogenous social interaction effects generated by  g m . 
The difficulties associated with distinguishing these two types of social interactions occur 
because, as indicated by (3),  g m  is functionally dependent on  g Y ; in a seminal paper 
Manski (1993) named this the reflection problem. 
Identification arguments are naturally based on technical conditions concerning 
the distributions of errors and regressors.  As such, it is often difficult to interpret 
requirements for identification in terms of substantive restrictions on individuals, and in 
our case, groups.   For this reason, we believe it is useful to have an example in mind.  
We focus on the analysis of classroom peer group effects: a question addressed by 
Angrist and Lang (2002), Boozer and Cacciola (2002), Hanushek, Kain, Markman and 
  5 
Rivkin (2003) and Hoxby (2000a,b) among others. Studies of this type consider the 
effects of classroom composition on individual educational outcomes. As such, they 
naturally involve contextual effects such as teacher or school quality as well as 
endogenous effects produced by peer influences. The classroom example will be useful in 
assessing the plausibility of various assumptions we make. 
  There are a number of previous studies of identification.  Manski (1993) studies 
identification in linear and nonparametric contexts and emphasizes the absence of 
identification when little prior information is available.  Brock and Durlauf (2001b,2003) 
analyze identification for binary and multinomial choice models.  They show that for 
relatively weak conditions on the joint distribution of  i X  and  g Y , the parameters of (1) 
are identified when 1) 
,, ig g XY FF ε εα = , so that the random payoff terms are identicially 
distributed across all individuals regardless of group membership or individual 
charactetristics and 2) Fε  is known a priori.  The subsequent discussion shows how to 
extend this to the case where Fε  is unknown and also explores how various types of 
unobservable variables affect identification. Other contributions to the study of the 
identification of social interactions include Bayer and Timmins (2002) who analyze 
identification in multinomial logit models with various types of unobservables.  
In evaluating the conditions under which identification does or does not hold for 
this model, we will follow the standard practice of assuming that population distributions 




3. Identification with random assignment and no group level unobservables 
 
In this section, we consider identification for the binary choice model of social 
interactions when agents are randomly assigned to groups and when there are no group 
level unobservables present in the individual payoffs defined by (1). Each of these 
assumptions represents a substantive restriction on the class of environments under study.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
5Manski (2003) provides a definitive analysis of partial identification. 
6Bisin, Moro, and Topa (2002) discuss estimation strategies for this model. 
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While random assignment may be appropriate for examples such as classrooms in which 
schools explicitly follow such policies in forming classes, it clearly does not apply in 
contexts such as residential neighborhoods; in fact analyses such as Bénabou 
(1993,1996), Durlauf  (1996a,b) and Hoff and Sen (2002) make clear that social 
interactions are an important factor in understanding neighborhood composition.   
Similarly, the absence of group level unobservables represents a strong assumption in 
terms of model specification.  In a context such as neighborhoods, a range of social 
factors such as willingness to contribute to public goods are typically unobservable.
7   
We work with the following set of assumptions in order to provide a baseline for 
identification analysis.  Our strategy is to first understand why identification holds under 
this particular set of assumptions and then consider how relaxation of random assignment 
and the absence of group level unobservables affects what may be learned about social 
interactions.  We work with the following assumptions; in the assumptions and elsewhere 
() supp Z  denotes the support of the random vector Z . 
 
.1 A .
, ig XY FF ε ε = ; ( ) 0. 5 Fε = .  
 
.2 A .  Fε  is absolutely continuous with associated density dFε ;dFε  is positive 
almost everywhere on the support ( ) , LU  which may be ( ) , −∞∞. 
 
A.3.   X  does not include a constant; there exists a group   such that for at least 
one 
0 g
j x  (with associated nonzero coefficient  j c ),  ij x  varies continuously over R  and 




                                                           
7Recent efforts to measure these types of group characteristics are currently under way.  
A very important example is the Project on Human Development in Chicago 
Neighborhoods, in which neighborhood characteristics such as collective efficacy, which 
refers to factors such as how a neighborhood provides support for its members, for 
example through assistance to neighbors in childrearing are being measured via extensive 
  7 
A.4.   does not include a constant; there exists at least one   (with associated 
nonzero coefficient  ) that varies continuously over 
Y l y
l d R  and supp( ) l Y−  is not contained 





g X XY FF = . 
 
A.6.  0  g g α =∀ . 
 
Variants of these assumptions will be maintained throughout and are based on Cameron 
and Heckman (1998).  They are somewhat more restrictive than those that appear in 
Manski (1988) but are easier to interpret, and so we employ them.  Assumption  A.1 
imposes an i.i.d. assumption on the random payoff terms  i ε  within and across groups. 
 imposes a certain degree of smoothness on  .2 A Fε .   and   impose linear 
independence among the observable individual-specific and group-specific characteristics 
as well as a “large support” assumption on one element of each.   operationalizes the 
idea of random assignment by equating it with the independence of the distribution of 
individual characteristics within a group from the observable characteristics of the group, 
i.e. 
.3 A .4 A
.5 A
g Y .  A.6 eliminates the unobserved group effects.  
  The set of parameters   and the distribution function  , , ,  kcdJ Fε  are 
observationally equivalent to the alternative set of parameters  , , ,  kcdJ  and alternative 
distribution function Fε  if  
 




                                                                                                                                                                             
survey efforts. Important studies based on this project include Sampson, Raudenbush and 
Earls (1997) and Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls (1999). 
  8 
  () ( ) 21 2 gg g X g m F k c X d YJ m d F F k c X d YJ m d F εε =+ + + − =+ + + ∫∫ 1 g X −  (5) 
 
for all elements of   and  () supp X ( ) supp Y .  Identification holds if observational 
equivalence between the model parameters and distribution function and an alternative 
implies they are identical, i.e. 
 
  , c ,  ,   and  . kk c dd JJ F F ε ε ==== =  (6) 
 
Notice that in the conditions for observational equivalence, eqs. (4) and (5) we assume 
that  g m  is observable since it is a moment associated with observables. 
Assumptions A.1-A.6 provide our first identification result: 
 
Proposition 1: Identification of the binary choice model with social interactions and 
random assignment to groups 
 
The parameters of the binary choice model with social interactions (1) under self-
consistency condition (3) are identified up to scale under assumptions    .1 .6. AA −
 
Proof.  Relative to Manski (1988), the key to establishing identification in the 
presence of social interactions concerns the treatment of   g m . Put differently, if it were 
known that  , so that  0 J = g m  did not affect individual choices, then identification of the 
remaining parameters up to scale has been shown in Manski (1988) Proposition 2, 
Corollary 5. The key features of Manski’s proof are 1) the quantile independence of  Y Fε , 
i.e.  () ()
g Y FzF z ε ε =  for some   and all  , which is implied by A.1 and 2) the large 
support assumption on 
z g
1 x , which corresponds to A.3. The regressor  g m , in turn, is a 
function of  Fε ,  ,  X F g Y  and (if there is more than one solution to (3)) the selection rule 
  9 
for  g m .
8  The extension of Manski’s results to the social interactions case requires that 
the endogeneity of  g m  under (3) is accounted for. 
First, we consider identification of   and  c Fε .  Without loss of generality, assume 
that  1 x  is the element of  X  with nonzero coefficient and continuous variation across R ; 
we normalize  . For individuals in group  , let  1 1 c = 0 g
00 0 g g kd Y J m g κ = ++ and 
00 0 g g kd Y J m κ =+ + g .  Hence for members of the group, the probability that  1 i ω =  is 
(
0 ) g i Fc ε κ + X  under the true set of parameters and random payoff distribution function; 
under the alternative this probability is  ( )
0 g i Fc X ε κ + . 
Identification of   and   requires that for all elements of supp c F ( ) X among members 
of  ,   0 g
 
  () ( ) ( )
00  supp
, 









Identification in the sense of (4) is established in Manski (1988) Proposition 2, Corollary 
5.  Therefore, the analysis of identification of the remaining model parameters may be 
conducted under the assumption that   and  c Fε  are known. 
We consider the identification of the remaining parameters. Using the random 
assignment assumption A.5, define a mapping  ( ) ψ ⋅  that is invariant across groups
9
 
                                                           
8From the perspective of identification, it is not necessary to model how an equilibrium is 
selected for a given group, since  g m  is observable as it is a sample moment (as discussed 
in the text).  However, the issue of selection does matter for estimation, since the 
estimation implicitly requires construction of an estimate of  g m  that is consistent with the 
estimated parameters.  Some suggestions in this respect are found in Bisin, Moro, and 
Topa (2002); this is a problem we are currently working on as well. 
9Invariance of  () ψ ⋅  follows from the assumptions   and   which state that neither  .1 A .5 A
Fε  nor   varies across groups.  X F
  10 
  ( ) ( ) 2 X Fc X d F ε 1 ψ ςς = +− ∫  (8) 
 
It is obvious that  () ψ ⋅  is monotone increasing and nonlinear in ς . Taking 
, g g kd Y J m ς =+ +  then  
 
  () ( ) 21 g gg g kd Y J m Fkc Xd Y J m d F m ε X g ψ ++ = + ++ − = ∫  (9) 
 
where the second equality in (9) restates (3).  
This mapping facilitates identification analysis.  Monotonicity of  () ψ ⋅  implies 
that the second observational equivalence requirement (eq. (5)) holds if and only if 
 
  ( )  supp gg gg g kd Y J m kd Y J m Y Y ++ = ++ ∀ ∈  (10) 
 
Rewriting (10) as  
 
  () ( ) ( )  supp gg g J Jm k k d dY Y Y −= − + − ∀ ∈  (11) 
 
it is apparent that observational equivalence between two distinct sets of parameters 
requires that  g m  is a linear function of  g Y , since by   at least one element of  .4 A g Y  varies 
continuously across R . However, such a linear relationship cannot exist since  g m  is 
bounded between   and 1.  Therefore, (11) can only hold if  1 − JJ = . Therefore   is 
identified.   
J
 Imposing  JJ = , observational equivalence of  and    with    and   kd kd  requires 
that  
 
  ( ) ( ) 0 supp gg kk dd Y Y Y −+ − =∀ ∈  (12) 
 
  11 
Under the assumption  , this can only hold if  .4 A kk =  and dd =  which completes the 
proof that the model parameters are k ,  ,   and  .  c d J
What are the key features of the proof?  Assumptions  - A.3 allow one to 
identify   and   using intra-group data from one group.  As such, the assumptions do 
nothing more than allow one to invoke Manski (1988) Proposition 2, Corollary 5.   
Relative to the social interactions model, the conditions allow one to construct 
.1 A
c F
g m  across 
neighborhoods and therefore treat it as an observable, given a set of parameters  ,  ,   
and  .  Assumptions   and   mean that the self-consistency condition (5) for 
observational equivalence of expected average choice levels may be inverted to produce a 
condition for observational equivalence on the linear payoff differentials between the 
choices, i.e. (4).  Assumption A.4 ensures that there is enough variability in 
k c d
J .5 A .6 A
g Y  to identify 
   and    given this transformation of the integral condition (5) into the linear 
condition (10).  
, k , d J
  The identification argument exploits the fact that because  g m  is bounded between 
 and 1, it cannot be linearly dependent on  1 − g Y  under the large support assumption A.4.  
To be clear, what drives our result is not that  g Y  has unbounded support, but rather that 
g Y  possesses a sufficiently large support to reveal the nonlinear relationship between  g Y  
and  g m  that holds for any given set of parameters and a given random payoff 
distribution, cf. eq. (3) and its form under random assignment, eq. (5).  This is the reason 
why the so-called reflection problem (Manski (1993)) does not arise in the binary choice 
case; see Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b) for more discussion. The large support assumption 
is a simple way of ensuring that the data reveal the nonlinear relationship between  g m  
and  g Y . To understand the importance of this nonlinearity, it is useful to recall Manski’s 




ii g g kc X d Y J m i ω ε = +++ +  (13) 
 
  12 
under the assumption that  ( ) g ig YE X Y = , i.e. the contextual variables are the group level 
averages of the individual characteristics.  Rationality of subjective beliefs, using the 













so that  g m  is linearly dependent on the other regressors in (13).  This linear dependence 
is ruled out in binary choice models.
10 
11
  This analysis indicates that the unobservability of dFε  is not an impediment to 
identification; however, it is important to note that accurate estimates of the magnitude of 
social interactions will critically depend on the accuracy of estimates of this density.  Our 
proof relies on the identifiability of dFε  using observations within a single group.  In a 
context such as classrooms, it may be problematic to estimate dFε  using data from a 
single group. In such cases, it will be important to employ estimation methods that allow 
information on dFε  to be constructed from data from all groups.  
 
    
4. Group level unobservables 
 
As we have suggested, one important limitation to Proposition 1 is that it assumes 
that no group level unobservables are present in the individual payoff functions.  Such 
unobservables are likely in many contexts even when there is random assignment.  In the 
case of classrooms, differences in teacher quality are one such unobservable. In this 
section, we relax assumption   and consider some ways to achieve identification when  .6 A
                                                           
are no group level unobservables; see Brock and Durlauf (2003) for a formal statement 
and proof. 
10The boundedness of choices is important in establishing identification in other contexts.  
For example, it plays a key role in the development of bounds on treatment effects, cf. 
Manski (1990). 
11This same nonlinearity argument also implies that parametric multinomial choice 
models are identified when group memberships are randomly assigned and when there 
  13 
group-level unobservables are present.  The analysis will show that prior information on 
the distribution of group level unobservables is necessary to achieve even partial 
identification of social interactions; we provide examples of prior information that is 
useful in this respect.
12    
In order to preserve the random assignment logic, we further replace   and   
with   and   
.1 A .5 A
.1 A ′ .5 A ′
 
.1 A ′.
,, ig g XY FF ε εα = ; ( ) 0. 5 Fε . =  
 
.5 A ′. 
, gg X XY FF
α = . 
 
These modified assumptions preserve the equality across groups of the intragroup 
distributions of individual observable and unobservable terms. 
When group level unobservables are present, our identification definition needs to 
account for their presence.  Modifying eqs. (4) and (5), identification in the presence of 
unobservable group effects requires that for a given set of parameter values  , 
set of unobservables 
, , ,  kcdJ
g α , and random payoff distribution Fε , that if there exists an 
alternative set of parameters  , , ,  kcdJ , set of unobservables  g α , and distribution 
function Fε  such that 
 




                                                           
12When individual agents face more than two choices, additional routes to identification 
may exist beyond those we study, as shown in Bayer and Timmins (2002); the basic idea 
in this work is that comparisons among subsets of the choices may be used to identify 
unobservable choice-specific payoff terms. 
  14 






mF k c X d Y J md F





=+ + + +






for all elements of   and  () supp X ( ) supp Y , it must be the case that eq. (6) holds.     
Relative to the earlier definition of identification, notice that the values of the 
unobservables, i.e.  g α  and  g α  must be allowed to differ when comparing alternative sets 
of parameters.   
  Without any additional assumptions, identification fails for the social interactions 
model with unobserved group effects.  This is easy to see.  Clearly, identification of   
and 
c
dFε  is unaffected by the presence of  g α ; the argument in Section 3 is unaffected 
since in the current case all that changes is that 
00 0 0 g gg kd Y J m g κ α = ++ +. Hence, we 
proceed taking these as known. 
We again work with the mapping  ( ) ψ ς  defined by equation (8).  For 
g gg kd Y J m ς α =+ + + ,  
 
  () ( ) 21 g gg g gg X kd Y J m Fkc Xd Y J m d F m ε g ψ αα +++= + +++ − = ∫  (17) 
 
Comparing (17) and (9), observational equivalence requires, recalling that  () ψ ς  is 
increasing, monotonic and invariant across groups,  
 
  () +  supp gg g gg g g kd Y J m kd Y J m Y Y αα +++ = ++ ∀ ∈  (18) 
 
If one chooses  g gg Jm α α =+  and  0 J = , then  g gg gg kd Y J m kd Y α α + ++ = ++  
, which means that   and   are not identified.  We can therefore state  () supp g Y ∀∈ Y J d
 
Proposition 2.  Nonidentification with unobserved contextual effects 
 
  15 
The parameters of the binary choice model with social interactions (1) with self-
consistency condition 3, are not identified under assumptions  .1 A ′,  ,  ,   and 
. 
.2 A .3 A .4 A
.5 A ′
  
  What sorts of additional assumptions beyond  .1 A ′,  ,  ,   and  .2 A .3 A .4 A .5 A ′ will 
imply identification?  A number of possibilities exist that may, depending on the 
particular environment, be plausible.  We consider two alternative classes of 
identification strategies. 
 
i. identification based on restrictions of the joint distribution of observables and 
unobservables 
  One way in which identification may be achieved in the presence of 
unobservables is via the use of prior restrictions on the distribution of these 
unobservables either in isolation or in terms of their relationship to various observables.  
The utility of this approach will of course depend on the plausibility of these restrictions.   
 
a. restrictions on the support of the unobservables 
 
In the proof of Proposition 1 a large support assumption, combined with the 
intrinsic nonlinearity of the binary choice model, produced identification.  We first 
explore how the logic of the large support assumption may be adapted to the model with 
group-level unobservables.  An analogous large support assumption in the unobservable 
case is   
 
U.1.  () () supp  is unbounded. ggg dd Y αα −+ −  
 
This assumption produces identification of   but does not permit identification of  , as 
stated in Proposition 3. 
J d
 
Proposition 3. Partial identification of the binary choice model with social 
interactions and unobservables with unbounded support 
  16 
 
The parameter   is identified up to scale but   and   are not identified under 
assumptions  ,  ,  ,  ,
J k d
.1 A ′ .2 A .3 A .4 A .5 A ′ and  .  .1 U
 
 
Proof. Rewrite (18) as  
 
  () ( ) g gg JJ m kk dd Y g α α −= − + − + −  (19) 
 
Under  , the right hand side of (19) will possess full support. Since  .1 U [ ] 1,1 g m ∈− , (19) 
cannot hold unless JJ = , so the   is identified.  Imposing this on (19),   J
 
  ( ) 0 ggg kk dd Y αα − +− +−=  (20) 
 
which imposes no restrictions on k  and   since  d g α  and  g α  are unrestricted. This 
verifies the proposition., 
 
  In our judgment, this is a relatively unappealing route to identification since it is 
difficult to fairly imagine a priori cases in which the unbounded support assumption U.1 
can be made credible. Perhaps one could identify cases where, for example, government 
policies of some type have introduced large unmeasured heterogeneity into schools via 
lumpy investments in facilities. 
 
b. restrictions on the relationship between observables and unobservables 
  
  A second approach to restricting the unobservable contextual effects so as to 
achieve some sort of identification is through restrictions on the relationship between the 
unobservables and observable contextual effects.  We consider two sorts of restrictions of 
this type. 
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stochastic monotonicity 
 
One way to restrict the relationship between observables and unobservables is to 
impose stochastic monotonicity between the types of contextual effects.  This type of 
assumption is analogous to those studied in Manski (1997) and Manski and Pepper 
(2000). Without loss of generality, assume that each element of  g Y  is measured so that 




M.1. First order stochastic monotonicity of group level unobservables. If  g g YY ′ > , 
then the conditional distribution of unobservables in  g′,
g g Y F
α ′ ′ , is first order 
stochastically dominated by 
g g Y F
α .  
 
This assumption is sufficient to facilitate partial identification of social 
interactions. 
 
Proposition 4. Pattern reversals and partial identification of endogenous social 
interactions 
 
If there exists a pair of groups such that 
 
  ( ) ( )  and  g gg g g YY E m Y E m Y g ′ ′′ ><  (21) 
 
then it must be the case that   and   is large enough to produce multiple equilibria 
under assumptions  ,  ,  ,  , 
0 J > J
.1 A ′ .2 A .3 A .4 A .5 A ′ and  .1 M . 
 
() g g EmY  is defined by   Proof. From (3), 
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() ( ) 21
gg gg g g g X Y EmY F k c X d Y J m d Fd F ε α α =+ + + + ∫   −  (22) 
 
If the observables for group  are ordered according to  g g g YY ′ >  so that by M.1 
g g Y F
α  
first-order stochastically dom nates  i
g g Y F
α ′ ′ , and if  0 J = , then   ( ) () g gg EmY Em g Y ′ ′ >  
since  () g gg F k cX dY Jm ε α ++ + +  is asing in   incre g Y  (recall that  g Y  is measured so that 
0 d ≥ ) and  g α .  This monotonicity can only be br en if  0 J >  and there are multiple 
ria, so at the equilibrium expected average choice le f groups  g  and g
ok
equilib  th vels o ′ are 
such that  g  has coordinated at an equilibrium other than the one with the h est 
expected av ice level where  g
igh
erage cho ′ has coordinated at an equilibrium other than the 
lowest expected average choice; otherwise the pattern reversal in (21) could not have 
 
  One m
occurred. 
ay consider alternatives to 
, 
.1 M ; one natural example is stochastic 
inance based on an index,  i.e.  dom
 
.2 M . First order stochastic monotonicity of an index of unobservables.  There 
exists a scalar index function  ( ) I  such that if  ( ) ( ) g g I YI Y ′ > , then the conditional 
distribution of unobservables in g′, () g g IY F
α ′ ′ , is first order stochastically dominated by 
() g g IY F
α  . This allows one to state a Corollary to Proposition 4. 
 
Corollary 1. Pattern reversals with an index and partial identification of social 
tions 
 of groups such that 
                                                                                              
interac
 
If there exists a pair
                                                                                
e usual way, i.e.  12 VV >  means each element of 
1 is greater than the corresponding element of  2 V . 
13Vector inequalities are measured in th
V
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  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )    and   gg g g g g IY IY EmIY Em IY ′ ′′ ><  (23) 
case hat > nd  is  nou ultiple equilibria 
nder assumptions 
 
then it must be the   t J  a J large e gh to produce m   0  
.1 A ′,  .2 A ,  .3 A ,  .4 A ,  .5 A ′ and  .2 M .  u
 
This corollary includes cases such as  ( ) g g I Yd Y = . 
  Are monotonicity assumptions plausible?  This is of course a matter of judgment; 
nevertheless we believe there are cases where this is so.  For example, consider the case 
of teenage smoking.  According to one recent national survey in 2003, 10.0% of black 
teenagers had smoked a cigarette in the last 30 days whereas 29.4% of white teenagers 
had.  As ethnicity is a natural social group, this sort of behavioral difference seems hard 
to understand without endogenous social interactions, since one would generally expect 
that the contextual factors that are omitted by these raw percentages, e.g  family income, 
etc. would have the property of making the black teenage smoking rate higher than the 
white rate.
14  Similarly, we could conjecture that for unobservable teacher quality, 
stochastic monotonicity might hold with respect to observable variables such as average 
mily income or per pupil expenditure.
15
nearity 
ume a linear relationship between the observable and 






  Alternatively, one can ass
 
() 01 , 0 gg g g g ff Y E Y αµ µ =+ + =  
 
                                                           
14Various social interaction effects have been directly estimated in studies such as Krauth 
(2002). 
15The power of the stochastic monotonicity assumption also implies the importance of 
testing it when possible. Barrett and Donald (2003) have recently proposed methods for 
doing this that may be relevant in this context. 
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This is a much stronger assumption than stochastic monotonicity, but will in turn provide 
an important increase in the restrictions that  0 J =  places on data. To see this, we 
construct the variable  ( ) ()
1 Prob 1 , , ii i ZF X Y ε ω
− == g g α
g
 which by (1) equals 
 
  ii g g Zk c Xd YJ mα = +++ +  (24) 
 
One can compare this to the regression equation 
 
 
  01 2 ii ZX Y g i π ππφ = +++  (25) 
 
Under   and assumption  ,  0 J = .1 L ( ) , ii g EX Y φ 0 =  whereas if  0 J ≠  there is a nonlinear 
dependence between  i φ   nd  i a X  and  g Y , given the nonlinearity inherent in the relationship 
between these vectors and  g m  as shown in (3). Assumption L.1 thus places a restriction 
on  i Z . 
 
 
Proposition 5. Nonlinearity of transformed outcome probabilities in the presence of 
endogenous social interactions 
 
If  , then  0 J = i Z  is linear in  i X  and  g Y  whereas if  0 J ≠ , then  i Z  is not linear in  i X  and 
g Y , under assumptions  ,  ,  ,  , .1 A ′ .2 A .3 A .4 A .5 A ′ and  .1 L . 
 
  This implication is easily testable if one can construct an empirical analog to  i Z  
and so estimate (25) as a regression.  Granger and Terasvirta (1996) provide methods for 
testing whether the linear relationship in (25) holds.  One can also use the BDS test 
(Brock, Dechert, LeBaron, and Scheinkman (1996)) on estimated residuals from (25) to 
see whether the residuals are i.i.d.; acceptance of this null rules out the nonlinearity 
described in the Proposition.   
Can one construct such an empirical analog?  One possibility is suggested by the 
classroom example. Suppose that students answer a number of true false questions and 
that the proportion for student i is  .  Assume that the probability of a correct answer  ˆi s
  21 
follows (1), i.e. the probability of a given answer being correct is 
() ig g F kc X d Y J m ε +++ ˆ F .  If  ε  is an estimate of Fε , which is identified under our 
assumptions, then  ( )
1 ˆ ˆi Fs ε
−  is a sample estimate of  i Z .   
 
restrictions on the density of unobservables 
 
  A third route to identification in the presence of unobserved group effects lies in 
restricting the conditional density of the unobserved group effects given observed group 
characteristics, i.e. 
g g Y dF
α .  One such restriction is  
 
.1 P . 
g g Y dF
α is unimodal for all  g Y . 
 
This assumption leads to Proposition 6.  
 
Proposition 6.  Partial identification of endogenous social interactions when 
unobservables are unimodally distributed. 
 
If  , then  0 J =
g g mY dF  is unimodal whereas if 
g g mY dF  is multimodal, then   and   is 
large enough to produce multiple equilibria, under assumptions  ,  ,  ,  , 
,  and  . 
0 J > J
.1 A ′ .2 A .3 A .4 A
.5 A ′ .1 P
 
  Proof. Recall from (17) that  ( ) g gg mk d Y ψ α =+ + .  For fixed  g Y , one can 
compute the conditional density 




() () () ()









gg g gg g
gg g Y
dF m Y
kd Y Y kd Y Y
kd Y Y d F kd Y
α
ξξ





++= = ++ =
=− −= − − g
=  (26) 
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Given the unimodality assumption  , let  .1 P
* α  denote the maximum of 
g g Y dF
α  and 
( )
*
g mk d Y
* ψ α =+ + .  Suppose that   is not the unique maximum of 
* m
g g mY dF .  If not, 
then there exists a  such that 
** m ( ) ( )
** *
gg gg mY mY dF m dF m > . But this means that for 
** α  
defined by  ( )
** **
g mk d Y ψ α =+ + it must be the case that  ( ) ( )
** *
gg gg YY dF dF
αα α α > , 
which contradicts the definition of 
* α  and verifies the proposition.    ,
 
  The plausibility of unimodality will of course depend on context.  We conjecture 
that for a variable such as unobserved teacher quality, the assumption of unimodality is 
reasonable. In applying this condition, it is important to recognize that multimodality of  
g g mY dF does not imply multimodality of 
g m dF . Hence the arguments against multiple 
equilibria used by Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996) which are in essence based 
on the unimodality of 
g m dF  do not apply to this context.
16
 
ii. identification in panels 
  
Our discussion thus far has focused on identification in cross-section contexts.  
An alternative possibility for addressing group level unobservables lies in the use of 
panel data.  In the linear context, panels have been shown to affect identification in Brock 
and Durlauf (2001b) and Graham and Hahn (2003).  In the linear context, panels facilitate 
identification for two reasons. First, differencing of the data permits elimination of group-
level fixed effects.  Second, the timing of contextual and endogenous social interactions 
(eg. whether  , it ω  depends on  , g t Y  and  , g t m  or  ,1 g t Y −  and  ,1 g t m − ) can break the linear 
dependence between the contextual and endogenous effects that is the basis of  Manski’s 
                                                           
16 The reason why here and elsewhere multiple equilibria do not imply multimodality of 
g m dF  is that 
g m dF  in essence represents a mixture distribution where the different 
equilibria constitute components of a mixture. Mixture distributions are not necessarily 
multimodal; see Lindsay (1995, pg. 4-5) for a nice example. 
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(1993) finding of nonidentification in the linear case.  We will focus on the analog of 
differencing to see how the availability of panel data can affect identification; as such, 
our argument is an example of the analysis pioneered in Chamberlain (1984).  
 
Implications of time varying group membership characteristics 
 
Identification may be facilitated if group characteristics evolve across time.  This 
is the key idea used to identify peer effects in Hoxby (2000b); here we provide a 
formalization and generalization of her argument. To do this, we replace (1) with  
 
  () ( ) ,, 11 i i i g gt gt g it uu k c X d Y e Y J m , α ε −− = + + + + +− (27) 
 
where, relative to (1),  g Y  and  , g t Y  are vectors of group-specific characteristics that do and 
do not vary across time. In the context of classroom interactions, we are interpreting  g Y  
as incorporating variables such as observed teacher quality, for example, whereas we are 
interpreting  , g t Y  as incorporating variables such as the average parental income.  In this 
context, following previous arguments, one can construct a map  ( ) t ψ ς   
 
  ( ) ( ) 2
t t Fc X d F ε 1 X ψ ςς = +− ∫  (28) 
 
In (28),   is the density of 
t X F X  at time t.  We are therefore assuming that the 
distribution of  , it ε  is time invariant but are allowing the distribution  , it X  to change 
temporally.  As before,  () t ψ ς  is monotonic increasing and invariant across g; the only 
difference relative to (17) is that the map is allowed to vary across  . In parallel to our 
earlier discussion,
t
,, g gt gt g kd Y e Y J m ς α =+ + + + , producing 
 





t g gt gt g
) , g gt gt g X gt
kd Y e Y J m




++ + + + − = ∫
 (29) 
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The invariance of  () t ψ ς  across groups means that observational equivalence requires 
that for each time t 
 
  ,, ,, g gt gt g g gt gt g k dY eY Jm k dY eY Jm α α ++ + + = ++ + +  (30) 
 
which provides a linear panel structure when we consider (30) at different  ’s.  t
  The panel structure of (30) allows one to achieve identification. Formally, we 
have Proposition 7. 
  
Proposition 7. Partial identification in binary choice models with panel data 
 
For the model (27) and self-consistency condition (29),  , and   are identified 
whereas   and   are not identified, under assumptions 
, c e J
k d .1 A ′,  ,  ,   and  .2 A .3 A .4 A .5 A ′. 
 
Proof.  c is identified as shown in Proposition 1.  To analyze the remaining parameters, 
difference (30) to produce 
 




Eq. (31) implies that the  ,, g tg t mm − −  must be linear for all elements of the support of  
,, 1 g tg t YY − − .  If the domain of this support is large enough, then our nonlinearity argument 
will apply, so that ee =  and  JJ =  and so these parameters are identified.  The 
nonidentifiability of   and d  is immediate from the absence of any restrictions on the 
cross-second moments of the vectors 1 and 
k
g Y  with  g α .    ,
 
The logic of this proposition may be extended to more alternative frameworks. 
Hoxby’s (2000b) analysis provides a variant of this model in which it is assumed that 
within group   there are two individual types  g {, } TB W ∈  such that within-group social 
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interactions that are time varying only occur among members of a common type.  Thus, 
she works with a model of the form 
 
  () ( ) ,, ,, , 11 ii i g T g t T g t g uu k c X d Y e YJ m i t α ε −− = + + + + +− (32) 
 
The specific idea in her work is that   measures the percentage of T  in the 
classroom; intuitively, uses fluctuations in the percentage of blacks in a classroom to 
identify social interactions. Her approach suggests a strategy for identifying social 
interactions that exploits the two dimensional nature of groups at a point in time.   
Suppose that one observes two types within a classroom. This will allow the construction 
of the difference between two means of the two groups, 
,, Tgt Y
,, ,, Wgt Bgt mm −   which will prove 
useful in controlling for the common group effects  g Y  and  g α .  To see why, note first 
that for (32), the required self-consistency condition for type-specific expected average 
choices is  
 
  ()
,, ,, ,, ,, , 21
gT g t Tgt i g Tgt Tgt g XY Y mF k c X d Y e Y J m d F T B ε α =+ + + + + − ∈ ∫ ,  { , } W  (33) 
 
By analogy to (29) and (30), (33) implies that 
 
  ,, ,, ,, ,+  g Tgt Tgt g g Tgt gt g kd Y e Y J m kd Y e Y J m α α ++ + + = ++ +  (34) 
 
so that if one subtracts (34) with TW =  from (34) with TB =  
 
  () () ( )( ) ,, ,, ,, ,, 0  Wgt Bgt Wgt Bgt eeY Y JJ m m −− + − − =  (35) 
 
eliminating   g Y  and  g α .  If there is sufficient variation in  ,, ,, Wgt Bgt YY −  across groups, then 
the nonlinear relationship between  ,, ,, Wgt Bgt YY −  and  ,, ,, Wgt Bgt mm −  will require 
  26 
0 ee JJ −=−=.  This suggests how memberships in multiple groups (e.g. classrooms 
and race) can facilitate identification. 
 
 
5. Identification with nonrandom assignment 
 
i. Assignment based on observables 
 
  We first consider the case where agents are nonrandomly assigned, but where the 
assignment is a function of observable variables.  What this means is that assumption 
 no longer holds, i.e. different groups will be associated with different distributions of 
observables 
.5 A
g XY F . We will preserve the independence of this distribution from the group 
identity and so replace   with  .5 A .5 A ′′ 
 
.5 . A ′′
, =   and is independent of  .
gg g XY XY FF
α g  
 
We will also maintain assumption   that there are no unobservable group level 
variables; this may be replaced with a version of 
.6 A
.1 M ; we omit doing this for 
expositional purposes. 
If we maintain assumption   that the conditional distribution of the individual-
specific random payoff terms is independent of the group characteristics, our analysis 
would correspond to the case of strong ignorability in the treatment effects literature, cf. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).
.1 A
17   This will not be necessary in what follows; we will 
work with  
 
                                                           
17In Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), even though different individuals have different 
treatment probabilities, the conditional distribution of the effects of treatment is 
independent of whether treatment occurs, conditional on those variables that determine 
the treatment probability. In modeling the dependence of group memberships on 
observables, we are allowing memberships to depend on the observable  g Y , but the 
median of the random term in the payoff function is independent of these variables. 
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.1 A ′′ .
, =  and is independent of 
gg g YY FF g
εα ε ; ( ) 0 .5.
g Y F
ε =  
 
This assumption means that the group characteristics do not affect the median of the 
random terms but may affect other aspects of the distribution. 
  Relative to Proposition 1, selection on observables (as we have defined it), 
requires additional analysis because the argument that the  ( ) ψ ⋅  mapping defined by (8) is 
invariant across groups is no longer valid.  The original argument can be amended, 
however.  Consider the conditional mapping 
 
  () () 2
g g YX YF c X d F
ε ψς ς 1
g Y = + ∫ −  (36) 
 
For a fixed value of  g Y ,  ( ) g Y ψ ⋅  is monotonic, increasing, and invariant across 
groups just as  () ψ ⋅  was in the analysis of Proposition 1.  This means that if we set 
g g kd Y m ς =+ + , observational equivalence between parameters   and random 
payoff distribution 
, , ,  kcdJ
g Y F
ε  and alternative parameters  , , ,  kcdJ , and distribution function 
g Y F
ε  will require that (4) and  
 
  () () 21 2
gg g
g
gg gg YX Y Y
m




++ + − = ++ + − ∫∫
 (37) 
 
imply (6). The argument made earlier that this is true will again apply in this case. 
Therefore, we can conclude with this Proposition. 
 
Proposition 8. Identification with selection on observables 
 
The parameters of the binary choice model (1) with self-consistency condition (3) are 
identified up to scale under assumptions  .1 , .2, .3, .4, .5   and   .6 A AAAA A ′′′ ′ . 
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ii. assignment based on unobservables 
 
We finally consider identification when group memberships are related to 
unobservable individual characteristics.  To do this, we treat the membership question as 
the outcome of a matching problem and place some restrictions on the equilibria that 
emerge from the matching.
18  We assume that matching occurs with respect to indices   
and 
i A
g T  respectively.  We assume that 
 




  g g Td Y =  (39) 
 
In the context of peer effects in classrooms,   may be thought of as student ability and  i A
g T  as teacher quality. 
  We assume that matching occurs on the basis of individual and group quality. To 
do this, we assume that the individual characteristics  i X  are measured so that  .   
Individuals and groups are matched in the sense that higher group quality is associated 
with higher individual quality in the sense of the following assumption: 
0 c ≥
 
S.1.  For any two groups   and  g g′, if   g g TT ′ > , then 





                                                           
18This strategy is particularly useful when instrumental variables approaches to 
accounting for self-selection are not available. See Evans, Oates, and Schwab (1992) for 
an example.  See also Ioannides and Zabel (2003b) for an interesting analysis of how 
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  This assumption is weaker than one which imposes strict assortative matching 
between better groups and higher ability individuals; the latter is predicted by models 
such as Becker (1973).  The assumption is qualitatively consistent with a range of payoff 
functions that relate groups and individuals, see Sattinger (1993) for a useful survey of 
equilibrium matching problems.  Notice that the assumption replaces   since it places 




  This assumption leads to the following proposition.   
 
Proposition 9.  Partial identification of endogenous social interactions under 
assortative matching 
 
If  g g TT ′ >  and  , then  0 J = ( ) ( ) g gg EmT Em T g ′ ′ >  under assumptions 
.2, .3, .4, .5, .6 A AAA A ′′  and S.1. 
 
Proof.  Consider the binary choice model (1) under the assumption  .  It is 
sufficient to show that 
0 J =
( ) Prob 0 ig g AT T +>  is increasing in  g T , since 
() () g gi EmT E T ω = g  and  ( ) ( ) 2Prob 0 1 ig i g g ET A T T ω = +> − .  Rewriting this 
probability as  
 
  () ( ) ( ) Prob 0 Prob 1
g ig g i g g g AT A TT A T T FT +> = > − = − − (40) 
 
It is immediate from   that  .1 S ( )
g g AT F T −  is decreasing in  g T  hence  () Prob 0 ig g AT T +>  
is increasing in  g T . , 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
self-selection can provide additional information in identifying social interactions in 
linear models.  
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This proposition is useful as it indicates how the presence of endogenous social 
interactions may be inferred if  g g TT ′ >  yet  ( ) ( ) g gg EmT Em T g ′ ′ < .  As discussed in the 
proof of Proposition 4, this can only occur, under the specification we have assumed, if 
group   has coordinated on an equilibrium expected average choice level other than the 
largest of the possible equilibria associated with the it while group 
g
g′ has coordinated on 
an equilibrium other than the lowest possible expected average choice level among those 
it could have attained.  The existence of multiple equilibria immediately implies  .  0 J >
  The use of assortative matching to facilitate identification may be extended to 
panel data. To do this, modify (38) and (39) so that  ,, it it it Ak c X , ε = ++  and 
,, g tg Td Y e Y =+ g t  and assumption S.1 is modified to  
 
S.2. For any two groups   and  g g′, if   ,, g tg TT t ′ > , then 
, tg t A T F  first order 
stochastically dominates 
, tg t AT F
′ . 
 
This modification allows one to identify implications for  , g t m  as time varies.  For 
example, this Corollary to Proposition 9 is immediate. 
 
Corollary 2. Equality of average outcomes with equal observable contextual effects. 
 
 
If   or   but sufficiently small that  0 J = 0 J > , g t m  is unique, then  ,, g tg YY ′ = t
,
 implies 
, g tg mm ′ = t  under assumptions  .2, .3, .4, .5, .6 A AAA A ′′  and S.2. 
 
This corollary is useful because it indicates how evidence of endogenous social 
interactions may be adduced from temporal changes in  , g t m  when  , g t Y  does not vary.  As 
such this result complements the identification strategy of Hoxby which relies on 
fluctuations in  , g t Y . 
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6. Conclusions 
 
This paper provides a set of conditions under which identification holds for the 
binary choice model with social interactions.  Relative to previous work, the analysis 
establishes identification conditions without assuming that the distribution for random 
payoff terms is logistic, as is done in Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b).  In addition, some 
partial identification results are developed for models with unobserved group level 
variables. 
With respect to further work, we mention two difficulties with the analysis found 
here.  The analysis in the paper is heavily dependent on the fact that the distribution of 
random payoff terms may be identified based on within-group observations.  For contexts 
such as classrooms, in which the number of group members is small, accurate finite 
sample approximations to this distribution may prove to be problematic.  This suggests 
the importance of developing ways to combine information across groups to improve the 
accuracy of the estimation of this distribution.  Second, the paper assumes that the groups 
within which interactions occur are themselves known a priori.  As Manski (2000) has 
emphasized, this is a very strong assumption and may not be plausible in many cases.  
The absence of a coincidence between measured social groups and true social groups will 
induce complicated patterns of interdependences in errors across individuals as well as 
make it difficult to assess counterfactuals such as the effects of changes in the 
compositions of measured groups; examples of such counterfactuals include changes in 
the location of public housing or changes in educational policies regarding the tracking of 
students.  Hence, the extension of the measuring of social interaction effects to policy 
evaluation will require assessing potential model uncertainty of this type. Some of this 
work is currently under way. 
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